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Abstract
Nosocomial infection (i.e. infection in healthcare facilities) raises a serious public
health problem, as implied by the existence of pathogens characteristic to healthcare
facilities such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and hospital-mediated out-
breaks of influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome. For general communities,
epidemic modeling based on social networks is being recognized as a useful tool. How-
ever, disease propagation may occur in a healthcare facility in a manner different from
that in a urban community setting due to different network architecture. We simulate
stochastic susceptible-infected-recovered dynamics on social networks, which are based on
observations in a hospital in Tokyo, to explore effective containment strategies against
nosocomial infection. The observed social networks in the hospital have hierarchical and
modular structure in which dense substructure such as departments, wards, and rooms,
are globally but only loosely connected, and do not reveal extremely right-skewed dis-
tributions of the number of contacts per individual. We show that healthcare workers,
particularly medical doctors, are main vectors (i.e. transmitters) of diseases on these net-
works. Intervention methods that restrict interaction between medical doctors and their
visits to different wards shrink the final epidemic size more than intervention methods
that directly protect patients, such as isolating patients in single rooms. By the same
token, vaccinating doctors with priority rather than patients or nurses is more effective.
Finally, vaccinating individuals with large betweenness centrality (frequency of mediating
connection between pairs of individuals along the shortest paths) is superior to vaccinat-
ing ones with large connectedness to others or randomly chosen individuals, which was
suggested by previous model studies.
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1 Introduction
Nosocomial infection, that is, infection in healthcare facilities, is health-threatening for hos-
pitalized patients and caregivers (Gastmeier et al., 2005; Grundmann and Hellriegel, 2006).
Pathogens such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (VRE) are mainly nosocomial in the sense that the majority of cases are hospital-
related (Salgado et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2004). In addition, as observed in recent cases
of influenza (CDR weekly 2005) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (Ho et al.,
2003; Leung et al., 2004; Svoboda et al., 2004), nosocomial infection serves as an initiator or
a booster of epidemic outbreaks at urban community and world-wide levels. In accordance,
mathematical models specialized in nosocomial infections and their controls have been devel-
oped, with intensive emphases on antibiotic-resistant bacteria (Lipsitch et al., 2000; Pelupessy
et al., 2002; Forrester and Pettitt, 2005; Bootsma et al., 2006; Boldin et al., 2007) and inten-
sive care units (Pelupessy et al., 2002; Perencevich et al., 2004; Forrester and Pettitt, 2005;
Boldin et al., 2007). Quantitative statistical models for nosocomial infection have also been
reported (Cooper and Lipsitch 2004; Forrester and Pettitt, 2005; Forrester et al., 2007).
In this work we examine the possibility of using the information on social networks in
healthcare facilities for developing containment protocols. There have been many modeling
reports on disease spreading on complex social networks (Meyers et al., 2003; Christley et
al., 2005; Keeling and Eames, 2005; Meyers et al., 2005; Pourbohloul et al., 2005; Watts et
al., 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Green et al., 2006; Riley, 2007; Volz and Meyers, 2007). A
central theoretical finding is that hubs, namely, those who have contacts to relatively many
others, communicate and enhance disease transmission. Diseases spread to a great extent
with larger probability on heterogeneous networks such as scale-free networks in which the
number of contacts that each individual maintains is highly heterogeneous (Hethcote and Yorke,
1984; Anderson et al., 1986; Albert et al., 2000; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001). Such
heterogeneous networks are operative in sexually transmitted diseases (Liljeros et al., 2001)
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and computer viruses (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001).
However, this and other findings in network epidemiology so far do not seem to have a suf-
ficient descriptive power for nosocomial infections for two main reasons. First, social networks
of healthcare facilities may be structured differently from networks of urban communities or
the whole world. In terms of size, a hospital is typically much smaller than an urban com-
munity. In terms of microscopic structure, contact patterns in a hospital are regulated by
hierarchy defined by departments, wards, and rooms. To our knowledge, efficient containment
strategies for social networks with such modular structure have not been established. Second,
a healthcare facility is composed of individuals of distinct roles, such as patients, visitors, and
healthcare workers. Healthcare workers can be subdivided into different classes, such as nurses
and medical doctors. Susceptibility, mortality, infectiousness, and many other factors that af-
fect how diseases spread depend on the type of individuals. For example, junior doctors may
visit more wards than nurses do, possibly carrying pathogens from ward to ward (CDR weekly
2005). Patients may be less active but likely have larger case fatality (i.e. fraction of death
among infected individuals) than healthcare workers (Leung et al., 2004; Forrester and Pettitt,
2005). In urban community social networks, the role of different types of individuals in disease
propagation may not be so clear-cut.
In spite of seminal modeling work of nosocomial infection based on network analysis (Meyers
et al., 2003; Liljeros et al., 2007), how diseases spread in potentially hierarchical networks of
healthcare facilities composed of individuals of different classes is not sufficiently understood.
In this work, we model nosocomial infection in social networks based on observations of contact
frequency in a hospital in Tokyo. We simulate stochastic SIR epidemic dynamics on these
networks and evaluate effectiveness of intervention and vaccination protocols. We show that
medical doctors that move between wards, but not patients or nurses each of whom is attached
to a single ward, are principal vectors (i.e. transmitters) of pathogens. In accordance, we show
that reallocating patients to medical doctors reduces epidemic spreading to a larger extent than
preparing single rooms to isolate patients. We also show that the vaccination protocols that
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principally target healthcare workers, particularly medical doctors, located in key positions
determined by network analysis are more effective than those focusing on patients or on simply
most connected individuals.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
We construct two social networks in a community hospital located in Tokyo, based on medical
records collected at two instants, namely, a day in a weekend in September 2007 and a weekday
in November 2007. The use of the data in this study was approved by the Hospital Ethics
Committee. These two datasets are different mainly in that more nurses work on the weekday.
Another minor difference is that some resident doctors occupy very different parts of the two
networks because they change the department every month. We use these two networks as two
independent snapshots and do not consider longitudinal factors caused by, for example, shift
work, admission of patients, discharge of patients, and seasonality.
This hospital is a 482 bed tertiary referral teaching hospital, with 16 wards and 129 rooms.
Patients occupy either shared or single rooms. There are relatively few single rooms (37 rooms,
or 7.68 % of the total beds). A ward has 8.06 rooms on average (max 10, min 4) and usually
hosts patients from different departments. A department typically has patients scattered in
different wards. Therefore, as nurses work in single wards, they are likely to attend patients
from a number of departments. On average, about five nurses work in a ward (5.88 on the
weekday and 4.31 on the weekend).
As schematically shown in Fig. 1a, one line of the medical record contains the identity of
a patient accompanied by those of a nurse and medical doctors in responsibility. A patient is
assigned a single nurse and is examined by at least one doctor. Usually, a couple of doctors
form a team so that a patient is examined by multiple doctors in the team. A typical team
consists of two or three doctors of different ranks. A patient is also examined by multiple
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doctors when the patient registers at multiple departments, but such an occasion is rare (none
on the weekday and just one patient on the weekend). As a note, resident doctors (25 among
123 doctors on the weekday and 29 among 123 on the weekend) often belong to more than one
department, because they may retain their previous patients in addition to gaining new ones
every month in different departments. All the other medical doctors are specialists and belong
to only one department. All doctors, including residents, typically visit a number of wards over
which their patients are scattered, the maximum number of wards visited by a single doctor
for these data being five.
The edges of the networks, which represent social contacts between pairs of individuals,
are defined as follows. We denote patient, nurse, and medical doctor, by Pt, Ns, and Dr,
respectively. The Pt-Ns, Pt-Dr, Ns-Dr, and Dr-Dr edges (for example, a Pt-Ns edge is an edge
between a patient and a nurse) are determined based on the medical record (Fig. 1a). All pairs
of individuals in the same line of the medical record are connected to each other. Accordingly
doctors in the same team are connected to each other. Additionally, a patient is connected
to all the other patients in the same room (Fig. 1b). This is the single source of Pt-Pt edges.
Similarly, a nurse is connected to all the other nurses working in the same ward to form Ns-Ns
edges (Fig. 1c). We neglect other possible contacts, such as casual friendships that do not
appear in the medical record.
The edges of the networks are assumed to be fixed over time, undirected, and unweighted,
so that disease transmission occurs bidirectionally with the same strength. Even if a particular
Ns-Dr pair or Dr-Dr pair may appear in multiple lines in the medical record, we do not double
count this relation because double counting would lead to excessive weighting of Ns-Dr and
Dr-Dr edges. For example, the two doctors in the same team would be connected by five edges
if this team examines five patients.
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2.2 Epidemic dynamics
We simulate the stochastic susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model on the static observed
networks. Each individual takes one of the three states represented by S (susceptible), I (in-
fected), and R (recovered or dead). Initially, a prescribed index individual is infected, and all
the other individuals are susceptible. Any susceptible individual is subject to contagion when
that individual has an infected neighbor in the social network. We assume that the infection
rate is frequency-dependent, that is, proportional to the number of edges that an individual
has (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2004). We denote the unitary infection rate by λ. Assuming that the
possibility of infection events depends the present, but not past, configuration of S, I, and R
on the network, a susceptible is infected by each infected individual in the neighborhood with
probability 1 − exp(−λ∆t) in time ∆t. Note that, when ∆t is small, the probability that a
susceptible becomes infected is approximated by λ∆t times the number of infected neighbors.
Equivalently, an infected individual infects each of its susceptible neighbors with probability
λ∆t. The infection rate λ is common for different edges and individuals unless otherwise stated.
An infected individual continues infecting neighboring individuals until recovery occurs (and
the individual enters state R) after a random time. The transition rate from state I to state R
is set equal to unity for normalization, so that an infected individual transits to state R with
probability 1 − exp(−∆t) for time ∆t. When ∆t is small, this probability is approximated by
∆t, and one recovery event occurs per unit time on average. This event happens independently
of the neighbors’ states. Individuals in state R are assumed to be either immune or dead. We
consider both interpretations in the following analyses. In either case, they cannot infect, or
be infected by, other individuals.
Because the transition rate from state I to state R is normalized to unity, the infection
rate λ controls the strength of a disease. When λ is large enough, with high probability, the
number of the infected grows progressively in the early stages and the number of the susceptible
decreases accordingly. After some delay, state-R individuals begin to appear, and the number
of the infected individuals begins to decline. Finally the population is composed of only state
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S and R individuals, which halts the dynamics. We perform each numerical simulation until
this situation is reached. Because the SIR dynamics are stochastic, we take averages over trials
for calculating the mean statistics. For each configuration, the average is taken over 100 trials
for each index case and over all the individuals as index cases.
3 Results
3.1 Network structure
The observed weekday network contains 605 individuals (388 patients, 94 nurses, 123 medical
doctors) and 3046 edges (Tab. 1). The characteristic path length of the network, which is
defined as the mean shortest path length between all the pairs of individuals, L = 4.84. The
clustering coefficient, which counts the abundance of local connectivity by the density of trian-
gles normalized between 0 and 1, C = 0.534. A relatively small value of L and a large value of
C of this network implies the small-world property (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
Although the hospital network has a considerably smaller L than spatially structured net-
works such as the square lattice (a regular two-dimensional network), it is not perfectly mixed.
If we rewire the edges randomly with the degree (number of edges that an individual has)
of each individual fixed, L even decreases to 2.97 and clustering is lost (C = 0.0251). This
behavior of L and C upon random rewiring of edges is similar to that for the Watts-Strogatz
network model (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
The path length L of the original network is larger than the randomized network because
of some localization of individuals. First, patients are connected to each other within one room
only. Therefore, intraroom edges are dense relative to interroom edges. Second, each patient
and nurse is attached to a single ward and only connected to patients and nurses inside that
ward; only medical doctors link different wards. Therefore, intraward edges are dense relative
to interward edges. Third, doctors are localized in the sense that doctors visit only the wards
with patients from their own department and that doctors in the same team have correlated
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contact patterns and mutual connections. The entire network is composed of relatively dense
subnetworks (also called communities or network modules in network literature, e.g. Girvan &
Newman 2002; Palla et al. 2005) that are loosely interlinked in a hierarchical manner.
The degree distribution is shown in Fig. 2 separately for each class. Unlike social networks
underlying sexually transmitted diseases (Hethcote and Yorke, 1984; Anderson et al., 1986;
Liljeros et al., 2001) and computer viruses (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001), our hospital
social networks do not have right-skewed degree distributions. A skewed degree distribution
would imply that a fraction of caregivers with very large degrees are extremely busy, whereas
others are not.
3.2 Basic epidemic dynamics
The final epidemic size is defined to be the sum of the state R individuals regardless of the
class (Pr, Ns, and Dr) at the end of the epidemic dynamics, normalized between 0 and 1.
The average final size calculated numerically is shown in Fig. 3a (solid line) for the weekday
network. The final size increases as the infection rate λ increases, taking off the zero floor
around λ = 0.13, for which the basic reproduction number, which is the expected number of
secondary cases originating from an index case, crosses unity. Beyond this point, a large-scale
(i.e. major) epidemic may occur.
The distribution of the final size is shown in Fig. 3b. The average of the distribution
shown as each vertical cross section, i.e. for each value of λ, corresponds to the solid line in
Fig. 3a. Above a threshold infection rate, the distribution has two masses. One thin mass
is concentrated around zero and indicates that, despite a large infection rate, the epidemic
can quickly decline to extinction owing to demographic stochasticity of state I individuals (i.e.
minor epidemic). The other mass is centered around a positive value of the final size and
corresponds to the major epidemic. Precisely speaking, the major epidemic consists of two
peaks. This is because one ward, which is devoted to the psychiatry department, has 42 (of
605) individuals and is connected to the rest of the network via only two junior doctors. These
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doctors examine patients from departments to which they previously belonged, in addition to
patients from the psychiatry department. Suppose that the disease starts from the index case
in this ward. Disease must pass through the narrow channel composed of the two doctors to
spread to the rest of the population. This event occurs with a somewhat low probability even
for very large infection rates. This causes the lower peak of the upper mass around 0.9 in
Fig. 3b, which is eminent for λ ≥ 0.8. We confirmed that a two-mass distribution, possibly
with subdivisions of each mass reflecting modular structure of the network, underlies each of
the following numerical results. In addition, whereas an epidemic whose final size is near the
mean value rarely occurs because of the two-mass distribution shown in Fig. 3b, a larger mean
final size indicates a larger probability of major epidemic. Therefore we will show only the
mean values of the final size in later figures,
Both for nosocomial pathogens such as MRSA (Forrester and Pettitt, 2005) and other
pathogens such as SARS (Leung et al., 2004), the case fatality of hospitalized patients is much
larger than that of healthcare workers. The final sizes shown in Fig. 3a and 3b represent inci-
dences, that is, infection events. Frequency of observing severe manifestations or deaths needs
to be discussed separately. To highlight differential mortalities between healthcare workers and
patients (Leung et al., 2004), we assume that only patients, not nurses or medical doctors,
always die after being infected for some time (see Discussion for justification). The nurses and
doctors in state R are assumed to be cured after being infected. These individuals are counted
for the final size but not for the final fraction of mortality. Consequently, the final fraction of
mortality is defined to be the final fraction of state R among the patients only. The fraction
of mortality and its distribution, shown in Fig. 3c and Fig. 3d, respectively, change little from
those for the final size.
The randomized network yields a larger final size and larger mortality (dashed lines in
Fig. 3a and 3c) than the original network. This is because the randomized network has a small
L so that, on average, individuals are linked by a short distance compared to the case of the
original network.
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The weekend network has characteristics similar to the weekday network, with 521 indi-
viduals (329 patients, 69 nurses, 123 medical doctors), 2364 edges, L = 4.39, and C = 0.535
(Tab. A1). The randomized network has L = 3.015 and C = 0.0286. The degree distribution
and the SIR results for the original and randomized networks are shown in Figs. A1 and A2,
respectively. The final size, the mortality, and their distributions are shown in Fig. A2. These
results are qualitatively similar to those for the weekday network. The following results for the
intervention and vaccination protocols are also qualitatively the same for the weekday and the
weekend network. Therefore, we explain the weekday results in the main text and relegate the
weekend results to the Appendix.
3.3 Interventions
We examine the effects of three intervention methods on the suppression of epidemic spreading.
We design these intervention methods so that they may be practiced in real situations before a
potential epidemic happens. The cost of implementation is presumably the smallest for method
1 and the largest for method 3.
3.3.1 Intervention 1: reassigning patients to medical doctors
Medical doctors are likely to be efficient vectors of pathogens because they examine their
patients scattered in multiple wards. In contrast, nurses and patients are constrained to one
ward. In intervention 1, we reduce visits of doctors to different wards by reassigning patients
to different doctors. Originally a couple of doctors in the same department formed a team
to examine a set of patients, who were potentially scattered across different wards. Under
the intervention, we reassign the patients without destroying the team structure; we will relax
this condition in the next intervention method. Suppose that both teams t1 and t2 examine a
patient in ward w1 and another patient in ward w2. In the example shown in Fig. 4a, teams t1
and t2 trade one of their patients. Then team t1 examines two patients in ward w1 and team
t2 examines two patients in ward w2, thus allowing each team to visit just one ward. We apply
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this operation wherever possible so that we constrain each team of doctors to as few wards as
possible, often enabling confinement to just one ward.
By intervention 1, the numbers of Pt-Pt edges, Pt-Ns edges, and Ns-Ns edges are preserved
(Tab. 1). The number of Pt-Dr edges slightly decreases because some patients are reassigned
with a team of a smaller number of doctors after intervention than before intervention. The
number of Ns-Dr edges decreases because a doctor visits a smaller number of wards after
the intervention. Then, for example, doctor Dr1 in Fig. 4a tends to spend more time with
nurse Ns1, whereas this doctor is no longer connected to Ns2. The number of Dr-Dr edges
decreases because, in some departments, some of the teams are dismissed after intervention
1. In such departments, some doctors belong to multiple teams before intervention and to a
smaller number of teams after intervention. The edges in the original network that link two
doctors sharing dismissed teams only are absent in the post-intervention network. Due to the
reduction in doctor-related edges, the total number of edges decreases from 3046 to 2827.
The numerical results for the final size and the mortality after intervention 1 are shown
in Fig. 5a and 5b, respectively (lines with legend ‘1’). We find considerable decreases in both
quantities compared to the case of the original network. Note that this intervention does not
require introduction of additional infrastructure.
One may argue that the suppression of epidemics comes from a significant decrease in the
number of Ns-Dr edges. To exclude this possibility, we examine the network in which the Pt-Dr
and Ns-Dr edges are duplicated through the intervention. With this modification, doctor Dr1
and nurse Ns1 in Fig. 4a, for example, is connected by two edges. Equivalently, we increase the
transmission rate of this single edge twofold to account for the doubled contact rate between
them, which comes from the fact that Dr1 and Ns1 examine twice patients together (two patients
after the intervention versus one patient before the intervention). The edge duplication is also
done for a Pt-Dr edge whenever the number of doctors that examine the patient on this edge
decreases as a result of intervention. Consequently, the number of Pt-Dr edges and that of Ns-
Dr edges return to those of the original network. This implies that the quality of the medical
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service that we measure by the number of Pt-Ns and Pt-Dr edges does not degrade due to the
intervention. The number of edges in total after this modified intervention 1 is 3016, which is
close to the number for the original network (i.e. 3046 edges; also see Tab. 1).
The numerical results shown in Fig. 5a and 5b (lines with legend ‘1 (dup)’) indicate that
this modification little spoils the effectiveness of intervention 1. A large portion of the reduced
epidemics is owing to the reassignment of patients, but not to cutting edges.
3.3.2 Intervention 2: dissolving teams
Next we investigate a more costly intervention method. The team structure of medical doctors
generally enables them to reach better medical solutions through discussion and knowledge
accumulation in the team. It also helps training junior doctors. However, team structures
provide channels for rapid disease transmission among wards, with doctors serving as vectors.
Another related negative effect of the team structure is that patients and nurses are subject to
extra infection events because they are connected to multiple doctors.
We dissolve the team in intervention 2. In the schematic example shown in Fig. 4b, each
patient is examined by both doctors in the team before intervention. By intervention 2, we
assign each patient to one, but not two, of the doctors. For example, Pt1 was examined by
Dr1 and Dr2 before the intervention, but only by Dr1 after the intervention. In practice, this
intervention may be discouraged if it results in resident or junior doctors examining patients
alone. Therefore, we decompose the teams as much as possible under the condition that each
resident doctor remains teamed with a senior doctor. The numbers of Pt-Pt, Pt-Ns, and Ns-Ns
edges are preserved through the intervention. The total number of edges drops from 3046 to
2717 owing to the reduction in doctor-associated edges, as summarized in Tab. 1.
The final size and the mortality are shown in Fig. 5 (lines with legend ‘2’). Intervention 2
is more effective than intervention 1.
To calibrate the effect of the decrease in the number of edges, we do additional numerical
simulations. As an example, suppose that Pt1 in Fig. 4b is examined by Dr1 for twice as long
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after the intervention than in the pre-intervention situation where Pt1 is examined by two doc-
tors. Accordingly, we duplicate the edge between Pt1 and Dr1. In addition, we compensate
the contact rate, or the number of edges, between nurses and doctors by duplicating the cor-
responding Ns-Dr edges, as in intervention 1. Taking the edge duplication into account, the
numbers of Pt-Dr and Ns-Dr edges, as well as those of Pt-Pt, Pt-Ns, and Ns-Ns edges, are
preserved. A byproduct of this modification is that the service quality assessed by the amount
of the Pt-Ns and Pt-Dr edges is restored. The total number of edges after modified intervention
2 is 3004 (see Tab. 1 for the number of each type of edges), which is close to 3046, the number
for the original network. The persisting reduction in the number of edges comes from that
of Dr-Dr edges. As shown in Fig. 5 (lines with legend ‘2 (dup)’), this modification has little
influence on the effectiveness of intervention 2. As in intervention 1, the reduced mortality is
ascribed to the intentional changes in network structure, but not to simply cutting edges.
3.3.3 Intervention 3: introduction of single rooms
In intervention 3, we attempt to prevent disease spreading among patients by making all the
rooms single, as suggested by previous literature (Cooper et al., 2004). Accordingly, we isolate
the patients by removing all the Pt-Pt edges, with the other types of edges and hence the
service quality kept intact. The schematic of this procedure is shown in Fig. 4c. Then, the
total number of edges decreases from 3046 to 2382 (Tab. 1).
The final size and the mortality results shown in Fig. 5 (lines with legend ‘3’) suggest that
intervention 3 is not as effective as interventions 1 and 2, except when the infection rate is
large. Even if we focus on the patient cases only, as shown in Fig. 5b, it is more effective to
reduce Dr-related edges (interventions 1 and 2) than to reduce Pt-Pt edges (intervention 3).
Note that the number of removed edges is much larger (= 642/3046) than for intervention
1 (= 223/3046) and intervention 2 (= 332/3046). Generally speaking, cutting down more
edges typically results in a reduced epidemic size. However, this pattern does not appear for
the present network. This is because patients are largely confined to their rooms and Pt-Pt
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edges do not play an important role in epidemics on a large scale. For a very large infection
rate, intervention 3 is better than intervention 1. However, the final size and the mortality for
intervention 3 are still larger than those for intervention 2. For an extremely large infection
rate for which more than two-thirds of the population becomes infected, intervention 3 is
more efficient at control than intervention 2. Our claim that introducing single rooms may
be ineffective is consistent with an observation analysis (Cepeda et al., 2005) and a modeling
study (Bootsma et al., 2006) of MRSA.
3.3.4 Sensitivity analysis
To show the generality of the intervention results, we perform three sets of numerical simulations
in which we change infection rates of individuals differently. First, the rate at which each
susceptible nurse and doctor is infected is halved, representing the biological possibility that
patients are more likely to be infected than healthcare workers. Second, the rate at which
each infected patient infects susceptible neighbors is halved, representing the possibility that
healthcare workers have higher infection rates than patients. Third, the rate at which each
infected nurse and doctor infects susceptible neighbors is halved, corresponding to the opposite
of the second variation.
The effects of different intervention protocols on the final size are compared in Fig. 6 for
the three variations described above. The mortality results are quantitatively very close to
the final size results in Fig. 6 (not shown). In all the three variations, interventions 1 and
2 (particularly, intervention 2) are more efficient than intervention 3 at low to intermediate
infection rates, which agrees with the results for the original SIR model shown in Fig. 5.
3.4 Vaccination
We explore efficient vaccination strategies under the condition that vaccines are available only
to a proportion of individuals. The simplest strategy would be to randomly pick individuals
for vaccination. However, a number of studies suggest that random vaccination is inferior to a
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contact-based vaccination strategy in which those with largest degrees are vaccinated (Albert
et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2003; Pourbohloul et al., 2005; Bansal et al., 2006). In theory, a
degree-based vaccination strategy is effective for well-mixed heterogeneous networks in which
individuals are connected at random. However, as shown in Sec. 3.1, the observed hospital
networks are not entirely mixed in this sense, but instead have a modular, hierarchical structure.
We compare the degree-based vaccination strategy with other strategies. The degree is a
local measure of centrality by which individuals connected to many others are regarded to be
important. Many centrality measures have been proposed (e.g. Junker et al. 2006). In a
well-mixed network, the degree is correlated well with most other centrality measures so that
hubs are central in most senses. However, the observed hospital network is not entirely well-
mixed. As an example, we consider the betweenness centrality, which is a count of how often
an individual mediates the communication between arbitrarily chosen pairs of individuals along
the shortest paths (Freeman, 1979). Figure 7, which compares the degree and the betweenness
centrality of each individual in the hospital, indicates that the most connected individuals are
not necessarily those with the greatest betweenness centrality values.
For a fixed centrality measure, we vaccinate the 20 individuals with the largest centrality
values, thus effectively remove them from the network. Then we run the SIR dynamics on the
reduced network. The drops in the final size and the mortality size relative to those for the
original network are interpreted as the effectiveness of a vaccination method.
The final size (Fig. 8a) and the mortality (Fig. 8b) with each of four vaccination protocols
are compared to those for the original network. Degree-based vaccination is more effective at
reducing epidemics than random vaccination (compare lines with legend ‘random’ and ones
with legend ‘degree’ in Fig. 8), which agrees with the results in previous literature (Albert
et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2003; Pourbohloul et al., 2005; Bansal et al., 2006). The degree-
based vaccination is superceded by the betweenness-based vaccination for a wide range of λ,
agreeing with the previous modeling work by Holme et al. (2002). The betweenness-based
vaccination is effective because interward communication is inhibited after vaccination of key
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individuals. These key individuals are mostly medical doctors and sometimes nurses. In our
simulations, the two doctors who connect the nearly isolated ward to the remainder of the
network, whom we mentioned in Sec. 3.2, have the largest and the third largest betweenness
centrality values. These doctors are actually vaccinated in the betweenness-based protocol. A
disease does not enter a subnetwork if the entire network is fragmented after removing such key
individuals. Even if the network is not fragmented after vaccination, a chain of transmission
has to make detours, which makes disease spreading less likely. This is presumably because
important shortcuts owned by central individuals have been cut out.
If we recalculate the betweenness centrality every time after removing the most central
individual, the network generally falls apart in an earlier stage (Girvan and Newman, 2002;
Holme et al., 2002). By doing so, epidemic spreads are more suppressed (Fig. 8a and 8b,
lines with legend ‘recal-betw’). The improvement is eminent for a large infection rate for
which the disease tends to spread over many wards, infecting more than half the individuals
in the hospital (λ around 0.8 and beyond). However, the final size and the mortality for
nearly threshold infection rates (λ around 0.2) are slightly increased compared to the standard
betweenness-based vaccination.
Our vaccination protocols up to this point do not take into account whether vaccinated
individuals are patients, nurses, or medical doctors. We compare these class-mixed protocols to
ones in which central individuals of a specific class are vaccinated with priority. For example,
we vaccinate 20 doctors with the largest centrality values (doctor-first vaccination).
Based on the betweenness centrality, the final size and the mortality for patient-first, nurse-
first, doctor-first, and class-mixed vaccination protocols are shown in Fig. 8c and 8d. The
corresponding results based on the recalculated betweenness centrality are shown in Fig. 8e and
8f. For both centrality measures, the nurse-first strategy is less effective than the class-mixed
and the doctor-first strategies. This is because, even though some nurses have large centrality
values (Fig. 7b) comparable to those of the most central doctors (Fig. 7c), vaccinating nurses
does not lead to dissociation of different wards; only doctors connect wards. The patient-first
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strategy is the least effective at reducing both the final size (Fig. 8c and Fig. 8e) and the
mortality (Fig. 8d and Fig. 8f), because the patients have low centrality values irrespective
of centrality measure (Fig. 7a). The doctor-first strategy is more effective than class-mixed
strategy for the non-recalculated betweenness centrality (Fig. 8c and 8d) and vice versa for the
recalculated betweenness centrality (Fig. 8e and 8f). The doctor-first strategy is better for both
the non-recalculated and recalculated betweenness centrality for the weekend data (Fig. A4c-f).
We have also examined the vaccination protocols based on other centrality measures. For
each of the centrality measures examined (closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality, power
centrality, information centrality, and random-walk centrality; see Junker et al. 2006, for a
list of centrality measures), the overall tendency that the class-mixed and doctor-first vaccina-
tions are superior to the nurse-first vaccination, which supercedes the patient-first vaccination,
is reproduced (not shown). Betweenness-type centrality measures such as the random-walk
centrality turn out to be more effective at reducing epidemics than others. Whether the class-
mixed strategy is superior to the doctor-based strategy depends on the centrality measure and
whether the weekday network or the weekend network is used.
4 Discussion
We have investigated the effects of intervention and vaccination strategies using numerical sim-
ulations of the SIR model on hospital social networks. Both the intervention and vaccination
results suggest that medical doctors that link different wards are main spreaders of nosocomial
pathogens. To rewire the Pt-Dr relationship (interventions 1 and 2; particularly, intervention
2) is more efficient than suppressing Pt-Pt communication (intervention 3). Note that, in spite
of the relative ineffectiveness of intervention 3, it involves construction of single rooms, which
presumably costs more than interventions 1 and 2, and may result in reduction in the hospi-
tal admission capacity. Vaccinating doctors first suppresses epidemics more than vaccinating
patients or nurses first. Importantly, doctor-centered containment strategies are more effective
than patient-centered ones at reducing not only the final size of the entire population but also
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that of the patients.
We have found that the observed social networks do not have extremely right-skewed dis-
tributions of the degree, which differs from many other disease-related networks that have
scale-free degree distributions (e.g. Albert et al. 2000; Liljeros et al. 2001). Instead, our
observed networks in the hospital have modular and hierarchical structure regulated by wards,
rooms, teams of medical doctors, and departments. Different modules are bridged by healthcare
workers, especially by medical doctors. Therefore, the common result that scale-free networks
boost epidemics owing to hubs, which hold for well-mixed networks with right-skewed degree
distributions (Hethcote and Yorke, 1984; Anderson et al., 1986; Albert et al., 2000; Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Meyers et al., 2003; Christley et al., 2005; Meyers et al., 2005),
seems to be rather irrelevant to the current situation, as has been pointed out for other situ-
ations (Holme et al., 2002; Watts et al., 2005; Green et al., 2006; Ichinomiya, 2007). For our
networks, we have shown that the vaccination protocols based on the betweenness centrality,
which target individuals that tend to maintain shortcuts, are more effective than that based on
the degree. The network structure identified in this work may serve as a basis for network-based
quantification studies.
Healthcare workers have been suggested to be primary vectors and spreaders because they
visit different wards (Elder et al., 1996; Carman et al., 2000; Meyers et al., 2003; Ho et al.,
2003; CDR weekly 2005; Burls et al., 2006). Therefore, vaccinating healthcare workers may
be more effective than vaccinating patients in preventing nosocomial infection (Carman et al.,
2000; Meyers et al., 2003). These results are consistent with ours. We have further distin-
guished roles of different classes of healthcare workers, namely, medical doctors and nurses,
which was ignored in an observation study of nosocomial infection in which only patients were
considered (Liljeros et al., 2007). We also examined the effects of individuality in terms of
their position in the networks. We suggest that healthcare workers, doctors in particular, with
large betweenness centrality values are of high mobidity in nosocomial infection. Because the
betweenness centrality is an ad hoc measure for our purpose, there may be alternative measures
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more directly related to mobidity of individuals.
An implicit assumption underlying the vaccination strategies based on the betweenness
and most other centrality measures is that the information on the global network structure is
available. This assumption is not justified for urban community infections where the number
of individuals involved is large and exhaustive contact tracing is infeasible. In this situation,
a powerful vaccination strategy based on only the local information is ring vaccination in
which vaccinations are provided along chains of contacts reconstructed by querying friends’
names (Ferguson et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2003; Pourbohloul et al., 2005). An alternative
strategy is to abandon heterogeneous contact rates at the level of individuals and employ
a population-based approach in which distributions of contact rates are approximated using
discrete population groups such as age groups (Wallinga et al., 2006). However, the use of
global information can be practical in the nosocomial setting because healthcare facilities are
limited in size. In addition, the information about contacts between individuals may be more
available than in the case of urban community infection. We have obtained this information
by analyzing medical records.
To measure the mortality, we have assumed that the patients always die after being infected,
whereas healthcare workers do not. However, the results are robust with respect to the definition
of mortality. The difference between (i) the pattern of infection events for the entire population
(Figs. 3a, 3b, 5a, and 8a, 8c, 8e) and (ii) that for the patients (Figs. 3c, 3d, 5b, and 8b, 8d, 8f)
is unnoticeable, even quantitatively. This implies that, even if all the infected individuals are
assumed to eventually die (corresponding to (i)), or healthcare workers die of infection with
an intermediate probability (corresponding to mixture of (i) and (ii)), the results would rarely
change. In addition, the results are expected to be robust against reduction in the case fatality
of patients because reinterpretation of a fraction of state R patients as being recovered instead
of dead little changes the results.
There are some limitations to the current work. First, we have neglected the weight of
edges, or equivalently, heterogeneity in the transmission rate of individuals, except partial
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consideration in interventions 1 and 2 and in the sensitivity analysis. In reality, a Pt-Pt edge
may be stronger than a Pt-Dr edge because the patients in the same room spend much time
together, whereas a doctor examines a patient possibly for a couple of minutes per day. We
have ignored this factor because the information available is limited (but see Bansal et al.
2006) and because the actual edge weights will depend on the type of diseases. Related to this,
we have assumed frequency-dependent transmission in which the infection rate is proportional
to the number of edges involved. Although this assumption is valid for sexually transmitted
diseases (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2004), whether this assumption holds for nosocomial pathogens is
not known.
Second, our networks do not include some types of relations and individuals. For exam-
ple, there are three medical doctors for diabetes and one doctor for infection control in the
hospital. These specialist doctors examine patients belonging to different departments upon
request. However, our medical records miss such Pt-Dr relations. These doctors are expected
to interact with more wards than ordinary doctors to play a leading role in epidemic spreading.
We have also neglected radiographers and pharmacists that interact with patients in multiple
departments, and visitors that would link the hospital to the outside community. We have also
omitted social contacts outside of official hospital business. For example, two doctors may be
friends such that they have lunch together on a daily basis, and doctors in different teams may
share a office.
Third, we have assumed the simple transmission rule defined by the SIR model. Nosocomial
pathogens such as MRSA and VRE cause asymptomatic infection in which carriers, of which
there are many types, do not necessarily infect others. In the SIR model, incubation periods
are ignored and all the individuals are as susceptible and infectious as others at a common
infection rate. However, given the robustness of our results against heterogeneous infection
rates for different individuals shown in Sec. 3.3.4, we expect that our finding is extended to
more general situations of disease spreading. Modeling dynamics of particular nosocomial
pathogens is an important future problem.
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Fourth, we have not considered dynamics of social networks (Volz and Meyers, 2007), except
that we have confirmed that the main results are qualitatively the same at two time points (see
Appendix for the other data set). In reality, the members of a hospital change on a very short
time scale due to, for example, admission and discharge of patients (Bootsma et al., 2006;
Liljeros et al., 2007)
In conclusion, the present study examined the spread of nosocomial infection in explicitly
structured and observation-based social networks in a hospital, emphasizing the importance of
controlling medical doctors as a potential major vector of diseases. Despite the necessity of
various improvements, we believe that our exercise highlights specific hierarchical structure of
social networks of hospitals and associated disease spreading patterns.
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Appendix: results for the weekend network
In the main text, we explained the numerical results for the weekday network data. We show
the results for the weekend network data in Figs. A1, A2, A3, A4, and Tab. A1. The main
results are qualitatively the same at these two time points. Some differences are in the relative
effectiveness of the class-based vaccination strategies (Fig. A4c-f).
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Figure and Table captions
Figure 1: Construction of (a) Pt-Ns, Pt-Dr, Ns-Dr, Dr-Dr edges, (b) Pt-Pt edges, and (c)
Ns-Ns edges.
Figure 2: Degree distributions of the weekday network for different classes of individuals.
Figure 3: Disease spread in the weekday network. (a) Final size for the original network
(solid lines) and the randomized network (dashed lines). (b) Distribution of the final size. (c)
Fraction of mortality. (d) Distribution of the fraction of mortality. A brighter point in (b) and
(d) corresponds to a larger probability density.
Figure 4: Schematics of three intervention methods.
Figure 5: Effects of different intervention protocols for the weekday network. (a) Final
size and (b) fraction of mortality. Different lines correspond to the original observed network
(‘original’), networks after intervention 1 (‘1’), intervention 1 with edge duplication (‘1 (dup)’),
intervention 2 (‘2’), intervention 2 with edge duplication (‘2 (dup)’), and intervention 3 (‘3’).
Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis. The final size is compared for different intervention protocols
(see legends of Fig. 5 for details). The infection rate is halved for (a) susceptible nurses and
doctors. (b) infected patients, and (c) infected nurses and doctors.
Figure 7: Betweenness centrality plotted against degree for the weekday network for (a)
patients, (b) nurses, and (c) doctors.
Figure 8: Effects of vaccination strategies for the weekday network. (a) Final size and
(b) mortality for different centrality-based and random vaccination strategies. Different lines
correspond to the original observed network (‘original’), degree-based vaccination (‘degree’),
betweenness-based vaccination (‘between’), vaccination based on the recalculated betweenness
centrality (‘recal-betw’), and random vaccination (‘random’). (c) Final size and (d) mortality
for the vaccination strategy based on the betweenness centrality and the class of individuals. (e)
Final size and (f) mortality for the vaccination strategy based on the recalculated betweenness
centrality and the class of individuals. In (c)-(f), different lines correspond to the original
network (‘original’), Pt-first protocol (‘Pt’), Ns-first protocol (‘Ns’), Dr-first protocol (‘Dr’),
and class-mixed protocol (‘mixed’).
Figure A1: Degree distributions of the weekend network for different classes of individuals.
Figure A2: Disease spread in the weekend network. (a) Final size for the original network
(solid lines) and the randomized network (dashed lines). (b) Distribution of the final size. (c)
Fraction of mortality. (d) Distribution of the fraction of mortality. For a fixed λ, the upper
masses of the distributions shown in (b) and (d) actually consist of two peaks nearby. This is
because just a single junior doctor links the ward devoted to the psychiatry department with
39 (of 521) individuals to the rest of the network.
Figure A3: Effects of different intervention protocols for the weekend network. (a) Final
size and (b) fraction of mortality. Different lines correspond to the original observed network
(‘original’), networks after intervention 1 (‘1’), intervention 1 with edge duplication (‘1 (dup)’),
intervention 2 (‘2’), intervention 2 with edge duplication (‘2 (dup)’), and intervention 3 (‘3’).
See Tab. A1 for the number of edges for the networks before and after interventions.
Figure A4: Effects of vaccination strategies for the weekend network. (a) Final size and
(b) mortality for different centrality-based and random vaccination strategies. Different lines
correspond to the original observed network (‘original’), degree-based vaccination (‘degree’),
betweenness-based vaccination (‘between’), vaccination based on the recalculated betweenness
centrality (‘recal-betw’), and random vaccination (‘random’). (c) Final size and (d) mortality
for the vaccination strategy based on the betweenness centrality and the class of individuals. (e)
Final size and (f) mortality for the vaccination strategy based on the recalculated betweenness
centrality and the class of individuals. In (c)-(f), different lines correspond to the original
network (‘original’), Pt-first protocol (‘Pt’), Ns-first protocol (‘Ns’), Dr-first protocol (‘Dr’),
and class-mixed protocol (‘mixed’).
Table 1: The number of individuals and each type of edges for the original weekday network
and the networks after intervention.
Table A1: The number of individuals and each type of edges for the original weekend
network and the networks after intervention.
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Figure A3: Ueno and Masuda
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Figure A4: Ueno and Masuda
Table 1: Ueno and Masuda
type of edge original 1 1 (dup) 2 2 (dup) 3
total 3046 2823 3016 2717 3004 2382
Pt-Pt 664 664 664 664 664 0
Pt-Ns 388 388 388 388 388 388
Pt-Dr 927 911 927 857 927 927
Ns-Ns 245 245 245 245 245 245
Ns-Dr 661 488 661 444 661 661
Dr-Dr 161 131 131 119 119 161
type of individuals number
total 605
Pt 388
Ns 94
Dr 123
Table A1: Ueno and Masuda
type of edge original 1 1 (dup) 2 2 (dup) 3
total 2364 2168 2346 2094 2335 1872
Pt-Pt 492 492 492 492 492 0
Pt-Ns 329 329 329 329 329 329
Pt-Dr 753 710 753 675 753 753
Ns-Ns 124 124 124 124 124 124
Ns-Dr 513 378 513 350 513 513
Dr-Dr 153 135 135 124 124 153
type of individuals number
total 521
Pt 329
Ns 69
Dr 123
